In the haftarah of Emor, found in Yechezkel 44, we find a verse that appears to contradict verses in parshat Emor (or at the very least our interpretation of it).
The halacha is roughly that a regular kohen may marry any woman from any tribe of Israel who is not a prostitute (with specific definitions of this), nor may he marry a divorcee. The kohen gadol, in addition to this, must only marry a virgin (or perhaps/or in addition a woman under a certain age) of any tribe and may not marry a divorcee or a widow.
kohen gadol? No, for it states that these may marry widows. Can it be about a regular kohen? Why then the insistence on the widow of a kohen?
There are ways of making this work - an extra chumra taken upon them, or some other solution - see the relevant gemara. We might present (and others have) other possibilities.
In Vayikra 21, we have two sections of relevant verses. The first:
kohein may not marry a divorcee.
There is a section about the kohein gadol which ends Ani Hashem. Then, we have:
kohein gadol, and the law for marriage of kohein hedyot was already specified, and the fact that there is no petucha or setuma separating this from the section of kohein gadol, and the fact that this is specified in the singular, while the previous section was specified in the plural -- is that this law is only to the kohein gadol.
Thus, a kohein gadol may not marry a widow or divorcee, but only a virgin (or young woman) from his nation - kosher Israelites.
Yet we can just begin to understand Yechezkel's point. Namely, what is the meaning of מֵעַמָּיו? If we take this as from the tribe of kohanim, then this matches the point that a kohein gadol may only marry a virgin for the tribe of kohanim.
Turning now to the common kohein, we see he has a relaxation of this requirement. He may marry a virgin from any tribe, since no such restriction is mentioned. Thus Yechezkel may spell out כִּי אִם-בְּתוּלֹת, מִזֶּרַע בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל , as opposed to מֵעַמָּיו. Now, perhaps this exemption is only as regards virgins. The kohein gadol was prohibited from taking a widow (in addition to divorcee) from amav, his people, the tribe of kohanim. But this is a restriction on only him, so regular kohanim are exempt. Yet we might assume meamav distributes for the kohein gadol. That is, from those women who are in his tribe, כִּי אִם-בְּתוּלָה, his is only allowed the betulah.
Other kohanim would be allowed others. Which ones? Well, for betula, we relax meamav, and for the others -- namely almana (since gerusha is explicitly ruled out earlier) we relax the "only betula" restriction.
And which almana -- widow - is considered from his tribe? We see elsewhere that marriage changes tribal affiliations for women - in terms of ability to eat terumah, for example. Therefore, only a widow of another kohein is from amav.
Thus, in this -- or some similar -- way, Yechezkel can be in accord with our parsha in Emor.
However, we now have a problem. Namely, this does not accord with the halachic explanation of the pesukim!
One answer - we are Pharisees, and the derash level of Emor and Yechezkel is what we consider truth. Not some literal interpretation which ignores the important hermeneutical rules from which truth in Torah/Nach may be derived. On a derash level, we do not interpret either Emor or Yechezkel as outlined above and there is no contradiction. See the gemara. There is merit to this approach, and perhaps other approaches should be considered heretical. (A later post on this, and the very nature of derash and peshat, and how our understanding of such terminology has deviated, is in the works -- but who knows when...)
For the rest of this devar, I will omit some explicit Scriptural passages and gemaras, since it is quite late, and I need to get some sleep.
Assuming that Yechezkel meant what I outlined above, what are we to do? Is Yechezkel wrong and halacha right? Is halacha right and halacha wrong?
My solution, in brief, is this. In any generation (perhaps up to Rav Ashi, perhaps up to Rabbi), the Torah may be interpreted. The law follows this interpretation. (See Devarim 17:8ff).
halacha.
As Chazal point out, ובָאתָ, אֶל-הַכֹּהֲנִים הַלְוִיִּם, וְאֶל-הַשֹּׁפֵט, אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם - each court in its generation. Yiftach in his generation is like Shmuel in his generation. And it need not be the kohen but may be the general shofet, judge.
Any legitimate interpretation has the force of law and the Divine stamp of approval. Eilu veEilu Divrei Elokim Chayim. Yechezkel is entitled to his interpretation and we are entitled to ours.
But what of the fact that Yechezkel was saying this prophetically? Shouldn't that trump any later alternative interpretation?
No. Lo Bashamayim Hi. To cite Devarim 30:12:
bat kol (literally an "echo" rather than a voice, from on high) stated that the halacha was like Rabbi Eliezer, this was rejected because the Torah is not in heaven. (See Bava Metzia 59b).
Yechezkel has authority as a prophet, but as regards statements about Torah, he has as much authority as any other sage, and his interpretations of law must be considered and debated within the halachic (midrashic) framework and then accepted or rejected. Thus, prophetic law is allowed to differ with current, Tanaaitic, or Amoraic law. And halacha kebatrai - the halacha is like the later ones.
Now, this seems to be against the current in the gemara which seeks to harmonize many things in Nach with Pharisaic/Rabbinic interpretion of Biblical law. Yet we may attribute this to a general trend/desire to harmonize apparent contradictions in Bible and in Oral Tradition. Also, to the trend/desire of a type that states the Avot kept the Torah even including Rabbinic enactments (an opinion not universally held by Chazal, BTW).
parshiot
parshablog
-- email me: joshwaxman@yahoo.com
No comments:
Post a Comment